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Gestures in the Making
Mathias Girel
1 More  than  a  century  ago,  reviewing  the  raging  controversy  over  pragmatism,  Jean
Bourdeau wrote that “Pragmatism is an Anglo-Saxon reaction against the intellectualism
and rationalism of the Latin mind […] It is a philosophy without words, a philosophy of
gestures  and  of  acts,  which  abandons  what  is  general  and  holds  only  to  what  is
particular” (Trans. William James, W:MT, 113).1 Bourdeau certainly missed the point of
the first pragmatist revolution, but it can also be argued that, ironically, he would have
missed of good part of Giovanni Maddalena’s achievements to “complete” the pragmatist
revolution: gestures (more than acts) are the main subject-matter of this book, but this
leads by no means to “abandon what is general,” no more than it leads to do away with
words, signs and meaning. Quite the contrary.
2 The title  of  Maddalena’s  book should not  mislead:  if  it  addresses  the very notion of
gesture, in its ordinary sense, it is also an outstanding monograph on knowledge, reality,
and philosophy,  and it  bears  a  very fundamental  and bold claim with it.  Maddalena
argues that the pragmatists had a new approach to knowledge and reality in general,
which many readers of this journal will take for granted, but that, in some important
measure,  pragmatism  also  remained  an  “unfinished  business,”  an  “incomplete
revolution.” It is certainly the case that we can think of countless instances where the
pragmatists, starting with Peirce, call for a broader account of meaning, where gestures
can be included. To take only one example, Dewey had already made clear that the logics-
positivist  treatment  of  meaning  was  too  narrow,  and,  interestingly,  he  thought  that
gestures on the one hand, diagrams on the other hand, were left out of the scope of
symbols and language:
A minor objection to the use of ‘sentences’ and ‘words’ to designate what have been
called propositions and terms, is that unless carefully interpreted it narrows unduly
the scope of symbols and language, since it is not customary to treat gestures and
diagrams (maps, blueprints, etc.) as words or sentences. (LW 12: 284)2
3 In Maddalena’s reading, though, the Pragmatists never got fully aware of the way their
views departed from the dominant Kantian picture of knowledge, they remained trapped
in some of Kant’s dichotomies, and they never managed to make their own originality
explicit.  The  Pragmatists,  if  we  read  them carefully,  it  is  argued,  not  only  opposed
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Descartes but also Kantianism, on three major issues: nominalism, the weakness of the “I
think” in unifying reality and finally a certain kind of solipsistic idealism. Maddalena
shows that  this  reading applies  to  Peirce  –  sometimes  against  the  letter  of  some of
Peirce’s claims about Kant as well as against prominent contemporary readings – but also
to  Dewey and  even  to  James  and  Mead,  even  if  Peirce,  understandably  in  view  of
Maddalena’s previous publications, is given the lion’s share:
This book aims to provide a pragmatist alternative to some crucial aspects of Kant’s
philosophy. This alternative has not been explored yet within the contemporary
philosophical landscape, not even by classic pragmatists who often involuntarily
accept aspects of Kant’s legacy. (3)3
4 The proposed philosophy of gesture, which is meant both as a correction of the classical
views and a contribution to contemporary philosophy, is an 
attempt to foster pragmatist insight toward a closer unification of experience and
methods of  inquiry,  toward a different definition of  synthesis  and analysis,  and
toward what [Maddalena] call[s] “a complete synthetic pattern.” (28)
5 Maddalena  endorses  thus  a  radical  view,  beautifully  argued,  stressing  the  role  of
synthetic patterns in reasoning and others realms, cosmological and moral.  The most
concise summary of Maddalena’s thesis might be the following: “any synthetic judgment
coincides with the operation we have to perform in order to get at it” (46). Gestures are
the core of philosophies as well as they are the core of our lives.
6 To fulfill this program, the book has to provide a new account of synthetic reasoning
(“recognizing  identity  through change”),  coming to  grips  with  Kant’s  challenge  at  a
fundamental  level,  and  –  through a  thorough redefinition  of  synthesis,  analysis  and
vagueness – finds such a tool in the notion of “complete gestures” (“those in which new
meanings are synthetically acquired,” 9), which provide the subject-matter of the crucial
Ch. 4. They are first exemplified in Peirce’s graphs, then explored in different fields, in
ethics, in writing, in creativity and education. The basic insight of the book stems thus
from a  different  conception of  continuity  and change  “as  the  developing  pattern of
reality” (134), and uses the notion of gesture as a kind of phenomenological and semiotic
structure to provide an account of this synthetic reasoning.
7 Previously,  Chauviré (2008) had stressed the importance of mathematical practice and
Peirce’s ground-breaking position in that domain, in a book quoted by Maddalena. This
view,  shared  by  Wittgenstein,  is  also  instrumental  in  the  defense  of  Maddalena’s  “a
posteriori foundationalism” (“the foundation of mathematics comes through our doing
mathematics,”  159).  But,  here,  mathematics  is  understood as  a  kind of  metaphysical
laboratory: 
Doing mathematics means already dealing with the reality of universals. There is no
surprise  that  while  we  are  doing  mathematics  we  are  constructing  a  broader
metaphysical reality. (51)
8 It is quite striking that similar synthetic patterns, unexpectedly perhaps, are found in
moral life and ethics:
we are not the independent masters of detached reality. Indeed, it is the other way
around: we are part of a reality with which we cooperate, as much as we imitate its
intention by learning to perform the complete gestures taught by others. (189)
9 One leaves the book with a different picture of knowledge,  of  continuity,  but also of
action in general, Maddalena’s notion of “gesture” replacing the more ordinary notion of
“conduct” endorsed by the classical pragmatists.
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10 Part of the success of the book will depend on its ability to meet two challenges in future
discussions: 1) will the reader accept to see in the “complete gestures” of Ch. 4 a kind of
paradigm for gestures in general? 2) Will s/he accept the amplification of this to others
realms of reality? It is tempting to think that the book makes forcefully both points.
11 Such a comprehensive book of course raises further questions, and I wished to use the
present occasion to push the conversation with Maddalena further, on two different but
related points.
12 First, Maddalena offers a tantalizing picture of the Self and of subjectivity:
Our physical, moral, and ontological identity is not a pure, plain continuum; rather,
it is continuity between complete gestures that have built, and continue to build,
our identity so that we can recognize it. (117)
As a consequence,  this  seems to leave two ways for our (a posteriori)  identity to be
grasped: 1) from the perspective of others selves, who address us from the standpoint,
and on the background, of the continuity and the publicity of these complete gestures, as
they might perceive them. This would be the way our identity is recognized in our circles,
in the same way as Ulysses is recognized at the end of the Odyssey (107); 2) from our own
stance, so to speak, where we could either disown or endorse gestures that are attributed
to us, and sometimes imposed on us. Our voice, here, seems to be implied in the way “we
can” recognize this identity. This kind of conversation, or stance, and sometimes this
dismissal of the conformist identities that can be forced on us by the present dispensation
of society, have always been at the core of meliorism, from Emerson and Mill to James,
Dewey and other non-pragmatist thinkers such as Cavell. But this also leads to ask where
we can locate such an agency, between the cosmological and the epistemological, where
things can be what they are without factoring in our own voice. This is for example a
classical problem we face when we try to articulate the insights developed by James in
“What Makes a Life Significant” and the basic tenets of his radical empiricism. Maddalena
provides several clues at the end of the book about this problem when he deals with
“rational instinct” and “heart”:
they  work  not  only  as  negative  alarms  but  also  as  acceptations  or  positive
recognizing. Does this function hint at an ontological self? For now it is possible to
answer, with all pragmatists, that I am describing a “function.” (149)
13 In spite of the understandable warnings of the author about the scope of the book, we
wish to know more about this function, in the context of the synthetic patterns described
here: what is the grammar involved when we do not recognize a gesture as truly “ours”?
What is the status of these “unattained but attainable” states of our selves and of our
society, described by the meliorists, within the economy of things that is presented here?
Can they be accommodated?
14 The second question is related to the “social.” To make it short, in Dewey, and arguably in
Mead, gestures are social from the outset, even before articulated language emerges and
before  we  can  master  mental  concepts.  We  have  a  full-blown account  of  the  social,
though,  when we  are  able  to  endorse  roles,  when action  can be  not  only  public  or
collective  but  also  distributed.  Readers  in  the  last  century  have  felt  that  these
philosophies provided important elements to make sense of an “autonomy” of the social,
which is rooted in nature but cannot be reduced to a physicalist or biological account of
life, which is rooted individuals but cannot be reduced to individual conventions or acts.
In the last  Chapter,  which is  crucial  since it  involves a reshaping of  Kant’s  practical
reason (and of some of major Kantian distinctions, deeply rooted in his architectonics),
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there is a short discussion of “roles” in Mead, and the long and substantial footnotes 4
(Ch. 4), and 17 (Ch. 8), can be read as evidence that future developments will follow in
other writings, but specific accounts of the social realm are scarce in the book. Would
Maddalena allow for a specific “locus” of the social, between the world where we are all
“sub-creators,” and the practical judgment where we count as moral selves? Or is this
something  we  can  dispense  with,  when  we  have  mastered  the  logical  and  semiotic
foundation of complete gestures?
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